Shoot to Kill in Tehran:
Deployment of Private/Contracted Security Forces in the Suppression of Protests.
January 31, 2026

ICHR – Toronto, Canada: In the aftermath of Iran’s deadly January uprising, a growing body of reports and leaked material from Tehran indicate that thousands of unarmed protesters and bystanders were killed by live fire from state security forces and their proxy forces.

Against this backdrop, a set of testimonies collected by The International Center for Human Rights  (ICHR) from eight eyewitnesses and relatives of victims reveals an even more disturbing pattern: highly accurate, “shoottokill” fire aimed at heads and other vital areas, the conduct of shooters consistent with professional commandos, and incidents in which an Iranian commander, speaking with an Iranian accent, issues operational orders in English to his men while they open fire. Taken together with documented patterns of body transfer and concealment, these findings raise serious and credible concerns that, alongside official and proxy forces, some form of private or contracted security forces similar to structures deployed in other countriesmay have been involved in the repression of protests in Tehran.

Methodology

This report has been prepared by The International Center for Human Rights (ICHR) to document grave violations committed during the recent protests in Iran, with a specific focus on the possible deployment of nonconventional armed forces, including potential private or contracted security forces, in the suppression of demonstrators in Tehran. The primary objective of this inquiry is to identify and analyze patterns indicating the use of forces beyond officially recognized state units and regional proxy groups, particularly indications of security contractors or mercenarytype actors similar to structures observed in some other countries.​

Data sources and sampling:

IHRC’s findings are based on indepth interviews with eight eyewitnesses and relatives of victims who were directly present during the events in Tehran or who dealt with the immediate aftermath, including hospitals and the forensic system. While we received reports but we only relied on the interviews which were conducted remotely using secure channels in audio, written, and online formats, and the real identities of all witnesses are known to IHRC, although pseudonyms and anonymized descriptions are used throughout this report for their protection.​

Witnesses were selected through purposive sampling based on the following criteria:​

• Direct presence at scenes of shootings and violent dispersal of protests in Tehran.
• Ability to provide detailed descriptions of armed actors, including behaviour, language used in command, and patterns of live fire.
• Close involvement with families of those killed or seriously injured as a result of direct gunfire.​

Information collection

Semistructured interviews were used, focusing on three main clusters of questions:​

1. Precise description of time, location, and context of events, including streets, squares, hospitals, and the Tehran forensic complex (Kahrizak).​
2. Detailed descriptions of the appearance, behavior, and language of armed personnel, with particular attention to incidents where a leader or commander communicated with his unit in English.​
3. The postincident trajectory of bodies: transfer to hospitals, the forensic system, storage, identification procedures, and handover (or denial of handover) to families.​

All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and subject to a twostep process of internal review, correction, and coding to ensure internal consistency and minimize transcription errors.​

Content analysis and corroboration

ICHR conducted a qualitative content analysis of the full interview transcripts. Coding categories included:​

• Type and intensity of violence (e.g. headshots, sniperlike fire, use of militarygrade weapons).
• Behavioral patterns of armed personnel (pursuit of demonstrators into alleys, “hunting” patterns, use of specific types of motorcycles, masking and anonymizationpractices).​
• Language and command patterns (use of English commands by an Iranian leader with his forces; absence or presence of Arabic or Persian in operational communication).​
• Patterns relating to the treatment of bodies (mass inflow of corpses, coding systems, storage conditions, and reported numbers at hospitals and at the Kahrizak forensic facility).​

Corroboration operated on three levels:​

• Crosscomparison of different witnesses’ accounts to identify converging details and isolate contradictions.
• Comparison with known patterns from previous crackdowns in Iran (2009, 2019, 2022) and information on regional proxy forces’ operating modes.​
• Internal consistency checks within each narrative, examining chronological coherence, environmental details, and repetitive description of shooting patterns and injuries.​

Visual evidence and limitations

Witnesses consistently reported that many videos and photos were taken during the events but that a large proportion of them were subsequently deleted under duress, due to phone searches by security agents and prolonged internet shutdowns. As a result, ICHR did not have access, at the time of drafting this report, to independently verifiable video or photographic material directly depicting the specific units whose leader allegedly issued commands in English while firing on protesters.​

While no dedicated technical analysis of imagery could be conducted on such units, witnesses’ detailed accounts of weapons used, distances, accuracy of shots, and postevent treatment of bodies were assessed against other open and confidential sources on similar events and found to be broadly consistent.​

Ethical standards and witness protection

ICHR verified basic identifying information for each witness and confirmed their connection to the events described, including their relationship to deceased or injured persons where applicable. All witnesses provided informed consent after being briefed on the purpose of the investigation, potential audiences of the report (international human rights bodies, UN mechanisms, media, and legal practitioners), and the risks related to sharing their testimony.​

All data are stored in secure, accessrestricted environments, and no raw, personally identifiable material is shared with third parties. Any information that could reasonably lead to the identification of a witness or family member has been removed or anonymized in this public version of the report.​

Confidence level and limitations

Due to the lack of official documentation, absence of statereleased forensic data, and restricted access to independent visual material, many of the findings in this report necessarily rely on witness testimony and pattern analysis rather than documentary or photographic proof. The report does not claim to provide a complete picture of all events in Tehran, but it does present a coherent and mutually reinforcing set of accounts that raise serious concerns about the nature of forces deployed alongside regular and proxy units.​

Consequently, ICHR adopts a cautious but firm evidentiary standard: the report identifies serious, credible indications that private or contracted security forces, similar to structures seen in some other countries, may have been deployed in Tehran, but it refrains from definitive identification of specific companies, nationalities or chains of command in the absence of further corroborating material.​

Findings

1. Overall pattern of repression

Testimony collected by ICHR from eight eyewitnesses and relatives of victims depicts a pattern of largescale, systematic, and extremely violent repression in Tehran, characterized by the use of live ammunition, militarygrade firearms, and targeted shots to vital areas of the body. Witnesses repeatedly describe scenes of “human hunting”, where armed personnel on motorcycles pursued demonstrators into side streets and residential areas, firing with high accuracy and displaying no apparent concern for bystanders.​

This pattern – involving frequent headshots, strikes to the neck and chest, and immediate lethality after one or two bullets – markedly exceeds the shooting proficiency generally associated with regular Basij, police, or ad hoc paramilitary forces previously documented in Iran.​

2. Shooting patterns and level of training

Across multiple locations in Tehran, including but not limited to the areas around Pirouzi Street, Chaharrah Sarsabz, Sattarkhan, and Narmak, witnesses observed shooters using Kalashnikovtype rifles and operating in a manner consistent with trained marksmen. According to these accounts, the overwhelming majority of fatal injuries involved one or two bullets, most often to the head, neck, or upper torso, with very few instances of nonlethal limb shots.​

Witnesses who had prior experience of earlier protest cycles in 2009, 2019, and 2022 explicitly contrasted the precision and lethality observed in the latest crackdown with previous events, stating that “this time” the shooters behaved like professional commandos or highly trained snipers rather than ordinary Basij or riot police. This qualitative shift in lethality supports the hypothesis that specialized units with advanced firearms training were deployed.​

3. Language and command: use of English

A core element of this inquiry concerns the language used by certain command figures in interaction with armed personnel operating on the ground. In one particularly detailed account from the Naziabad district, a witness describes how a group of plainclothes gunmen fired at a person filming from a building, while a leader repeatedly shouted commands in English. According to this testimony, the leader, described as Iranian in appearance and with an Iranian accent, used phrases such as “Mister, stop” and later “Go, go” to instruct the shooter to continue or cease fire.​

The witness clearly understood the language used as English and emphasized that these were not random or misheard words but coherent, functional commands directed at subordinates. The choice of English – rather than Persian or Arabic – is particularly significant in a context where many of Iran’s wellknown proxy militias are Arabicspeaking and where local repression forces normally operate in Persian.​

Witnesses did not report any operational use of Arabic in the same scenes, which would have been expected had units such as Iraqi or other Arabspeaking militias been directly involved as frontline actors. This linguistic pattern suggests that at least some of the deployed forces may not have been fluent in Persian or Arabic and that English was used as a working language within the unit.​

4. Distinguishing from conventional proxy forces

Regional proxy forces historically associated with Iran – such as certain Iraqi or Lebanese armed groups – typically operate in Arabic and, when present in Iran, are usually reported as communicating in a mix of Arabic and Persian rather than English. In the testimonies reviewed by ICHR, no clear indications of Arabic being used as the primary operational language in the incidents under scrutiny were identified.​

In contrast, the combination of features described by witnesses – physically imposing gunmen, some with visible tattoos, masked faces, relatively standardized yet nonofficial clothing, high proficiency in precision shooting under chaotic conditions, and a commander issuing instructions in English – aligns more closely with patterns associated, in other contexts, with private or contracted security forces or mercenarytype formations. ICHRnotes that such formations have been extensively documented in other countries as being contracted for repression, urban warfare, or highrisk security tasks, including by state or stateadjacent actors.​

While this comparative pattern does not, on its own, definitively establish the legal status or corporate identity of the forces observed in Tehran, it provides a strong analytical basis for considering the hypothesis that private or contracted security forces, similar to those in other jurisdictions (including Russian private military structures and analogous entities), may have been deployed alongside Iranian state and proxy forces.​

5. Treatment of bodies and concealment

Witnesses provide highly consistent descriptions of the aftermath of the shootings, including the collection, transport, and handling of bodies in hospitals and at the Kahrizak forensic complex. Accounts refer to:​

• Dozens of corpses at hospitals such as AlGhadir, Ansari, and Imam Hossein, many of them not stitched or formally processed, lying wrapped in bloodsoaked blankets in courtyards and corridors.​
• Large numbers of ambulances and unmarked white vans, as well as big white containers, used to transport bodies, with some witnesses describing long queues of vehicles stretching several kilometers towards Kahrizak.​
• Testimony from staff at the forensic complex claiming that more than 10,000 bodies were received over roughly seventeen hours (from Thursday night to Friday afternoon), together with coded labelling of corpses with fivedigit numbers indicating very high volumes of deceased persons.​

Witnesses further report attempts to deny or delay the release of bodies to families, the secret transfer and burial of certain victims in distant towns, and efforts to fragment and disperse burials in order to avoid large, politically charged funerals. These practices are consistent with an intent to instil fear, obstruct accurate casualty counting, and limit the possibility of public mourning and documentation.​

6. Assessment

On the basis of the methodology described above and the testimonies analyzed, ICHR reaches several key assessments:​

     1. The pattern of shootings – dominated by headshots and other immediately lethal injuries delivered with high accuracy – indicates the deployment of highly trained shooters, whose proficiency goes beyond that commonly attributed to regular Basij, police, or typical paramilitary units previously documented in Iran.​
     2. The presence of an Iranian commander giving operational orders in English to his subordinates during live fire, in the absence of Arabic usage and in a context where witnesses understand English, constitutes a serious and unusual indicator that at least some of the deployed forces did not operate in Persian or Arabic as their primary language. This strongly suggests the involvement of nonlocal or contracted personnel who utilized English as a working language.​
     3. The behavioral, linguistic, and operational profile of these forces – as reconstructed from converging witness testimonies – is broadly compatible with known patterns of private or contracted security forces or mercenarytype units observed in other countries, including but not limited to certain Russian private military formations and similar entities.​
     4. The scale and organization of the killings, combined with the subsequent mass intake, coding, and handling of bodies at hospitals and at Kahrizak, point to an operation that was not only extremely violent but also centrally organized, with clear efforts to manage bodies in ways that reduce transparency and increase public terror.​

Conclusion

ICHR concludes that, based on the available evidence and applying a cautious but robust human rights investigation standard, there are serious and credible indications that private or contracted security forces, similar to structures seen in some other countries, were deployed alongside official Iranian forces and regional proxies in the suppression of protests in Tehran. At this stage, the organization cannot definitively identify the exact corporate entities, nationalities, or contractual frameworks involved, nor can it fully reconstruct the chain of command.​

However, the combination of highly trained lethal marksmanship, the operational use of English by an Iranian commander addressing his forces, the absence of Arabic in the relevant scenes, and the broader context of mass killings and concealment of bodies, together create a compelling basis for urgent further investigation by international human rights mechanisms, UN special procedures, and competent judicial bodies.

 

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